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Introduction
Despite constant post-war efforts to decipher the development process, it appears that
little practical progress has been made. Many theories have been proposed (some
leading directly to policy), but very few developing countries have succeeded in
breaking the bonds of underdevelopment. Social theorists from Karl Marx to Daniel Bell
have argued that economic development brings pervasive cultural change. Others,
from Max Weber to Samuel Huntington, have claimed that cultural values are an
enduring and autonomous influence on society. Empirically we find evidence of both
massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive cultural traditions. The
relationship of “culture” and “economic development” during the past fifty years can
be, and has been, viewed variably as causal, correlative or relatively autonomous.
The relationship between culture and economic development is extremely complex.
Notice however, that this assumes, to start with, collective agreement upon the
meanings of the terms (culture and development) is possible. Or indeed, that when
agreement is achieved, the terms are not so general that they become tautological or
lose all applicability. Working definitions will be provided below but the fact is that the
concepts of culture and development are both opaque, making them impervious to
meaningful discourse. Eagleton (2000) reminds us that “culture” has been used
differently in various historical and structural circumstances. The term stood for civility
in rural labour, “civilisation” in the 18 th century, and as a proxy variable for criticising
industrial capitalism in the 19 th century. Today, the trouble with usage of the term is
that it has come to mean, on the one hand, something disablingly local and
overspecialised--basically nothing more than the affirmation of a specific identity--and,
on the other, everything from a habit of mind, the arts, political institutions, to a whole
way of life.
Incorporating “modernisation” and “globalisation” into the analysis compounds the
definitional quandary. Modernity was a project of global conquest originating in Europe.
There are two ways to understand this. There is an obvious Eurocentric position, which
holds that because of the exceptional characteristics of European culture and
rationality, the people were able to transcend their limitations and extend their
influence across the world. The second is a less crude, but indirectly similar position,
which conceives of Europe, while not the normative centre of modernity, having
priority as the historical point of reference in any process of change from the 15 th
century onwards (Jameson and Miyoshi, 1998). The intellectual portrayal of
modernisation was as a political and economic proposition coming to the fore following
World War II, that equated the intellectual, cultural and technological advance of
victorious nations as something that needed to be emulated by the “poorer, less
civilised” peoples of the world. This is connected to the process of “modernity” which
began about five centuries earlier.
World historians, especially, are aware of the fact that the “shrinking” of the world
started as early as 1492. Indeed, mass migration, cross-cultural trade, warfare, and
colonization have economically, culturally, and politically been changing the shape of
world history over the past five centuries. So in that sense there is nothing new about
“globalisation”. Today, globalisation is a word that points to a phenomenon identified
interchangeably as a process, an historical event, or the end result of shifting “ethno-,
techno-, media- finance-, and ideo-scapes” (Appadurai, 1996: 32). Accordingly, it
replaces the unavailing verb, modernisation, because modernists and their opponents
depended on outmoded dualistic analyses such as “centre-periphery”, “north-south”,
“First World-Third World”, “developed-developing”, and other noted Cartesian
distinctions. A consequential tradition of post-Nietzschean philosophers (including
Heidegger, Sartre, Gadamer, Derrida, Foucault, James, Dewey, Quine or Rorty) would
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Oedipa Maas muses: ”Excluded middles,” are “bad shit, to be avoided.” She is
lamenting the absence, in her world, as indeed in our world, according to conventional
logics - of any third alternative to the polarities of dichotomous choice, any mode of
being that involves only yes and no, or existence and non-existence, or true and false
(Pynchon, 1972: 136).
The concept of modernisation was very much tied to the idea of re-creating the world
in the image of American and Western European principles and culture. More recently,
discussions of globalisation (culturally) describe a process by which the world is
becoming increasingly interconnected and unified, subject to homogeneous and
uniform processes of cultural unification. Characters such as Madonna and Michael
Jackson, or the corporate logos of McDonalds and Nike are examples of global
awareness.
Others would argue that relatively autonomous cultures coopt (Jordon, 1997) global
phenomena and re-construct them for local consumption. Numerous examples exist,
which would include:
Thai Boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam
Jazz in Europe
Irish bagels
Chinese tacos
Indian communities that celebrate Mardi Gras in the United States
Or, white American boys talking “rap” for that matter.
To be successful, cultural products such as music, sport, food, business, literature, etc.,
often require the approval of globalised audiences. It is also true that “global culture”
is, and always has been, filtered by every local group, assemblage, or social formation
to make it meaningful within particular social and historical circumstances. Media
ethnographers have explored the culturally specific interpretations given to American
popular cultural goods and note how producers and marketeers of these goods are well
aware of the necessity for local variations in commodity distribution. It is also true that
global audiences appreciate being able to identify the “local” in cultural products they
import. Global advertising campaigns display a marked consciousness of cultural
heterogeneity, often involving marketing strategies that are slotted into larger
campaign packages to appeal to, or to promote, specific cultural localities.
We proceed in the following section to define our terms, before proceeding to pursue
the relationship between “culture and economic development” as analytical concepts
during the past 50 years. This is done by examining the usage of the terms during two
major conceptual epochs, the first being that of “modernisation” and the second
presently under way, that of globalisation. We conclude that the emphasis on the
causality of one or the other concept is based on analytical laziness and the refusal, or
inability, to confront complexity and multicausality.
What Are we Talking About?
Culture
The total complex pattern of customary human behaviour, social forms and material
traits embodied in thought, speech, action, and artefacts and dependent upon the
human capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge, and systems of abstract
thought. This will include beliefs, morals, laws, customs, opinions, religion,
superstitions, and art.
Economic Development
An increase in the ability to “choose and make decisions” for the maximum number of
people, during the maximum length of time, that will result in a sustainable increase in
material and social welfare given allowances for both interpersonal and
intergenerational criteria.
Modernisation
A “conceptual framework that articulated a common set of assumptions about the
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materially and culturally deficient” (Latham, 2000). Specifically, modernisation
theorists posited a sharp distinction between traditional (read poor) and modern (read
United States) societies. They took for granted that economic development, from
traditional to modern, proceeded along a single straight, unambiguous line. Finally,
modernisation advocates expected that contact with vital modern societies would
accelerate progress in stagnant traditional societies.
Globalisation
Globalisation includes a spatial reorganisation of production, an increasingly common
interpenetration of industries across borders (Brooke, 2001), the spread of financial
markets, the diffusion of identical consumer goods, massive transfers of population,
resultant conflicts between immigrant and established communities in formerly
close-knit communities, and an emerging world-wide preference for less statism and
more democratic decision-making (Mittelman, 1997: 2).
This brings us to the issues and questions that have permeated the political and
economic texts on development for the past fifty years and remain the subject of this
paper.
Do certain cultural traits promote economic development? 1.
Does economic development adapt to immutable cultural traits? 2.
Does economic development instil certain cultural traits? 3.
Do cultural processes internalise and appropriate developmental
processes?
4.
Are culture and economic development relatively autonomous? 5.
We should be reminded at this point that this extremely fertile and intellectually
searching debate and dialogue, as to the institutional and cultural perquisites and
foundation for economic development has been simply ignored by most of those in the
economics profession (Bilig, 2000: 781). Discussions of culture in general or the
alternative propositions of class, colonialism, imperialism and racism or sexism were,
and are, not seen by mainstream professionals as being within the parameters of
economics. For them, these terms represent unimportant, irrational, messy noise,
which require ceteris paribus clauses. This and many other crucial debates with respect
to economic development have had little if any impact on the discipline. Therefore, you
will find, even today that most of the dialogue with respect to economic development
will be within the discourse of anthropologists, political scientists or sociologists. Of
greater concern is that most recently the sub-discipline of economic development is
losing support within the profession as a viable economic subject worthy of attention.
Consequently, those economists consulted with respect to issues of economic
development totally ignore (or worse, justify) the negative political and social
consequences of their advice.
Modernisation: Culture ≪-≫ Economic Development
The first issue of the first journal on development economics, Economic Development
and Cultural Change, came out in 1952. At that time there existed only a handful of
scholarly works specifically devoted to the subject. The prevailing view was that for
poor countries to achieve capital formation, productivity and consumption, comparable
to those in developed countries, it was necessary to duplicate the cultural institutions of
the latter. Ethnocentric ‘growth’ and development theories and the establishment of a
number of global development institutions such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund propelled one another as part of the Cold War.
One of the more strongly argued positions that poor nations must emulate rich nations,
was that of Walt Whitman Rostow (1960), who later as special assistant to President
Lyndon Johnson argued vociferously for intervention in Vietnam. The general
proposition taken by Rostow, and others, was that in order to produce and consume
like the wealthy, one had to change “traditional” cultural attributes and proceed in
orderly fashion to achieve a “take-off” into sustained development. In fact, the
Kennedy Administration has been seen as the “golden years of modernisation theory”
(Latham, 2000). The Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, and the strategic hamlet
program in Vietnam were all policies that drew their conceptual frameworks from
modernisation theory. The characters promoting these policy initiatives were some of
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Lucian Pye, Eugene Staley, and Lincoln Gordon. Under Kennedy, these and like-minded
professors were not just advising or speaking to the incumbents of power, they got to
put their hands on the levers.
Manifest Destiny!
God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for
a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-admiration. No! He has
made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where
chaos reigns... He has made us adept in government that we may
administer government among savages and senile peoples (Speech by
Senator Albert T. Beveridge from Indiana (1899-1911) in 1900, cited in
Ryser, 1992; also see Modern History Sourcebook).
There are fundamental historical roots for the ideology of modernisation, which
permeated the Kennedy administration, that can be traced back in the American
psyche to “Manifest Destiny”. In 1845, a democratic leader and influential editor by the
name of John L. O’Sullivan gave the movement its name. In an attempt to explain
America’s thirst for expansion, and to present a defence for America’s claim to new
territories he wrote:
.... the right of our manifest destiny to over spread and to possess the
whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development
of the great experiment of liberty and federative development of self
government entrusted to us. It is a right such as that of the tree to the
space of air and the earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle
and destiny of growth. (Brinkley, 1995: 352)
Although the movement was named in 1845, the philosophy behind Manifest Destiny
always existed throughout American History. It conveyed the idea that the rightful
destiny of the United States included imperialistic expansion (University of Groningen,
2001). The war with Mexico and appropriation of the Southwestern United States was
just one of a series of aggressive acts. An article in the Democratic Review in 1845
included the observation that: “Imbecile and distracted, Mexico never can exert any
real governmental authority over such a country…Anglo-Saxon emigration has begun to
pour down upon it armed with the plow and the rifle, and marking its trail with schools
and colleges, courts and representative halls, mills and meeting houses” (University of
Groningen 2001).
During the Mexican Revolution at the beginning of the 20 th century President Woodrow
Wilson established a working agreement with Francisco (Pancho) Villa, one of the most
powerful leaders of the Mexican revolutionaries. Wilson offered Villa the full support of
the American government on the condition that Villa pledge to incorporate a cultural
appreciation for private property and the same kind of democratic principles as existed
in the United States into his goals. Given Villa’s unequivocal agreement, in December
1913, Wilson publicly expressed his high regard for the Mexican revolutionary. In fact,
Villa gave his support to the American invasion of Vera Cruz, Mexico on April 21, 1914
to put down the resistance of civilians and naval cadets against American occupation
and use of the port (Katz, 1998: 311-312, 336). The commander of the U.S. forces
along the southern border with Mexico, General Hugh C. Scott, later to become chief of
staff of the U.S. Army had fought on the “Indian frontier”, participated in the Spanish-
American War, fought against the Moro’s rebellion against U.S. interests in the
Philippines, and been an administrator of the U.S. military government in Cuba. He
firmly advised Wilson that “only enlightened Westerners could guide these people
toward modernization and civilization” (Katz, 1998: 318). Rudyard Kipling, Nobel
Laureate in Literature in 1907 (Kipling, 1899) had much more poetically urged the
United States to help the inferior people of the world adjust:
Take up the White Man’s burden--
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives’ need;
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.…
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sophisticated psychological and cultural traits, also believed that traditional values were
not only mutable but could--and should--be replaced by modern values, enabling these
societies to follow the (virtually inevitable) path of capitalist development. The causal
agents in this developmental process were seen as the inhabitants of rich, developed
nations that would stimulate the modernisation of “backward” nations through
economic, cultural, and military assistance (Lerner, 1958; Weiner, 1966). According to
Latham (Latham, 2000) Cold War intellectuals were lost in a fog of ethnocentrism and
nationalism.
Backlash to Modernist Theory
Then came the ideological, political, and economic earthquake of the 1960s and culture
was conceptually pushed aside as the social sciences came to be strongly influenced if
not dominated by Structuralism, Institutionalism, Marxism and Dependency Theory.
“Modernisation” theory was not only criticized, it was ultimately pronounced dead
(Wallerstein, 1976). The post-war version of modernisation theory had seriously
neglected external factors, such as colonialism and imperialism, as well as the newer
forms of economic and political domination. The emerging neo-Marxist and world-
systems theorists emphasised the extent to which rich countries exploited poor
countries, locking them into positions of powerlessness and structural dependence
(Frank, 1966; Chase-Dunn, 1989; Chirot, 1977; Chirot, 1994; Wallerstein, 1974).
“Culture” was replaced with the specificity of class, race and gender in the
developmental process, all of which are still prominent in the social sciences as
analytical constructs. From this perspective, culture is a diversion from the allegedly
real processes in the contemporary world (or worse, is simply a purposeful cover for
capitalist, racist, and sexist oppressors).
Marshall Sahlins was also of significant cross-disciplinary importance as well with the
publication of his book Stone Age Economics (Sahlins, 1974). He alerted us to the fact
that our prevailing belief that industrialisation frees us from much of the drudgery
found in non-industrial societies is largely a myth. This provided a yet another antidote
to the “modernisation” school’s implicit assumptions of Western technical and moral
superiority. This fracture in the mythology of modernisation may be of less surprise
today, cross-culturally, given the epidemic of stress disorders in workplaces throughout
the world (Schor, 1991).
Globalisation: Culture ≪-≫ Economic Development
In 1985 the wheel turned once again, fuelled by a combination of factors including
Reaganism and Thatcherism. Lawrence Harrison’s 1985 book, Underdevelopment is a
State of Mind, was an opening ideological ambit in the resurgence of the concept of
culture. Since then there have been a number of collective manifestoes proclaiming the
rehabilitation of “culture” in the analysis of economic and political development.
Recently, Samuel Huntington (1998) strongly affirmed the importance of culture as the
primary variable for both development, and the conflict generated by that
development. He asserts that the world is divided into eight major “cultural zones”
based on cultural differences that have persisted for centuries. These zones were
shaped by religious traditions that are still powerful today, despite the forces of
modernisation. The zones are Western Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic
world, and the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American zones. What
we have here is a marker for a significant shift in scholarly opinion. Both Harrison and
Huntington have most recently collaborated to edit a book (Harrison and Huntington,
2000) in which the debate is broadened with 22 papers, with mainly pro-culture
causality and a few con positions represented.
The leading article in Harrison and Huntington (2000) is probably the most significant in
setting the tone of the debate. David Landes begins with the pithy and concise
sentence “Max Weber was right.” Weber (1958), trained in law and economics, was one
of the earliest social scientists who asked prescient questions about the relationship
between economy and culture. He argued that European capitalism was predicated
upon a unique and fortuitous combination of a particular institutional matrix and certain
cultural values (or “spirit”). In subsequent works on India, China, and the ancient
Hebrews Weber presented contrasting cases of situations in which either the
institutional or cultural environment was not conducive to the development of rational
capitalism. There has been a return to the scholarship of Weber by a number of social
scientists that commonly refer to themselves as “neo-Weberians” (Mann, 1986; Holton
and Turner, 1989; Swedberg, 1998). What Landes didn’t mention is that while all
neo-Weberians stress the importance of culture, they do not consider culture as either
a separate, or isolated, “box” apart from social, political, and economic life (Bilig,
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(1992) is correct about the end of history, and that Samuel Huntington (1998) is correct
about the coming of a clash of civilisations between the west and the rest. For Landes
the key to the success of the West has been its exceptional values and institutions,
which were and still are lacking in the rest of the world. Thus, Landes refers to China
as a culturally and intellectually homeostatic society that had indifference to
technology, lacked institutions for learning, abhorred mercantile success, showed
deliberate introversion, isolationism, risk aversion, irrationality, xenophobia,
arrogance, haughtiness, stunned submissiveness, self-defeating escapism, and so on.
Michael Porter (2000) turns the Landes argument around taking a global perspective.
Rather than arguing that particular culture traits are a pre-requisite for economic
development, he argues that it is the “international economic culture” that is pushing
every society toward productivity and values that are conducive to a global
homogenous culture. Jeffrey Sachs, noted for his crash through or crash advice to
transitional economies (Blanchard, et.al., 1994; Sachs, 1990) in his chapter for
Harrison and Huntington, generalises the culture thesis, proposing that “capitalist
institutions”, such as respect for property rights, a rule of law, and efficient markets,
are the key factors in economic development. This is similar to an earlier argument put
forward by Cox (1993) that tied globalisation to world capitalism, as a materialist
product of its dictates and compulsions; and not excessively different from Friedman’s
proposition (1999) that culturally speaking, globalisation is largely Americanisation –
from Big Macs to iMacs to Mickey Mouse.
Hardly coincidentally, since democracy and capitalism are often discussed together, a
large group, Francis Fukuyama (1996) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1981) most notably,
also view culture as a determining factor for the achievement of democracy (culture
being more or less synonymous with the concept of “social capital”). Finally, the
on-going debate (Krugman, 1997; Ling and Shih, 1998; Pye 1991) over the role of
culture in the economic ascendancy of eastern Asia was sharpened. This debate has
raged now for over two decades, both on the scholarly level (the issue of so-called
post-Confucian values as a factor making for economic success) and on the level of
political rhetoric (Asian values propagated with a pronounced anti-Western animus by
the “Singapore school”, Mahatir Mohamed of Malaysia, and other defenders of
authoritarian regimes in the region).
One of the few dissenters in the Harrison and Huntington book was Richard Shweder,
an anthropologist. He described himself as the token designated skeptic and issued a
detailed disagreement from the view that cultures should be looked at in terms of their
contribution or non-contribution to “progress.” Elsewhere, Andre Gundar Frank (1998)
has accused Landes, and others, of a blatant Eurocentric historiography and social
theory that concentrates inquiry through European and American rose-coloured
spectacles, blacking out the evidence from the rest of the world and distorting that of
the West itself. Frank sees this type of scholarship as racist ideology, masquerading as
analysis. It was not Europe but Asia, and particularly Middle Kingdom China, which
remained predominant in the world until at 1800. The subsequent Decline of the East
and the shift of the centre of gravity to the West were more globally than locally
determined temporary processes that have run their historical course and are already
coming full circle with the contemporary renewed rise of East Asia and particularly of
China.
A fascinating, non-Eurocentric, historical analysis has been written by Andre Wink
(1990), in which he examines the complex and intimate involvement between the
Islamic Middle East and India for a millennium, up to the 18 th century. Profound
cultural changes in both the Middle East and India were largely a function of the trade
and commerce opened up by Mughal conquest (Wink, 1990: 360). The conquest and
Islamisation of the northwestern part of the Indian sub-continent, far from being minor
and peripheral as most textbooks of Indian history treat it, was, according to Wink, an
important crucial step leading to the integration of India into an intensifying world
trading pattern. Economic development, important for both was the dynamic force that
brought about historical change in this part of the world.
Elliott and Harvey (2000) argue in a case study on Jamaica that: “…development
problems will never be solved by policies that ignore the fundamental underlying
problem: the vast inequities in power arising from…political, social, and economic
history.” The implied causation between economic progress and cultural values that
promote pro-market, pro-private property-based institutions is due in large part to a
neoclassical economic perception of Western European development (see for instance
Scully 1988). Not only is such an interpretation of the industrial and commercial
revolutions open to debate, but also, the circumstances of poor nations are hardly akin
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and colonial status, along with the specific geography of the island of Jamaica,
combined to create the plantation economy, not value-weakness (Elliott and Harvey,
2000: 398). Not surprisingly, this historical pattern created vast inequities in terms of
the ownership of the island’s productive assets and income and a legacy of racism. The
agricultural land base was monopolised and a new low-wage urban worker was created
(Bakan, 1990). Once wide disparities are created the basic structure of society tend to
reinforce differences, but elites will also take conscious steps to preserve their status.
Because they dominate the government, the economy will work to serve the needs of
the rich, rather than the masses. And when economic activity is not directly concerned
with maintaining class position, the existence of inequality leads both elites and the
impoverished to seek status via conspicuous consumption. “The most significant
current problem is the monopoly of power held by Jamaican elites. They control
economic activity, and they have no immediate incentive to do any more than work to
maintain the status quo. The roots of this inequity go back 300 years” (Elliott and
Harvey, 2000: 399).
In this sense the classical Marxist perspective on capitalism continues to provide an
explanation that remains quite convincing, despite its own Eurocentric limitations. That
is that capitalists expand their accumulative activities and overcome thereby all
geographic, cultural and political barriers that obstruct their path.
Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many
capitalists by few, there develops, over an ever-extending scale, the
cooperative form of the labor process, the conscious technical application
of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the economizing of all
means of production, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the
world-market, and with this, the international character of the capitalist
regime (Marx, 1987: 714-715).
Empirical Evidence Leads to Complexity
There exists strong empirical evidence that economic development is associated with
shifts away from absolute norms and values toward values that are increasingly
rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). The shift
from pre-industrial to industrial society wrought profound changes in people’s daily
experiences and prevailing worldviews (Bell, 1973; 1976; Inglehart, 1988; Inglehart,
1997). Pre-industrial life, Bell (1976: 147) argues, was a “game against nature” in
which “one’s sense of the world is conditioned by the vicissitudes of the elements, the
seasons, the storms, the fertility of the soil, the amount of water, the depth of the mine
seams, the droughts and the floods”. Industrialisation brought less dependence on
nature, which had been seen as inscrutable, capricious, uncontrollable forces or
anthropomorphic spirits. Life now became a “game against fabricated nature”, a
technical, mechanical, rationalised, bureaucratic world directed toward the external
problem of creating and dominating the environment. As human control of the
environment increased, the role ascribed to religion and God dwindled (Bell, 1973:
148-149). The emergence of post-industrial society seems to be stimulating further
evolution of prevailing worldviews, but it is moving in a different direction. Life in
post-industrial societies centres on services, and hence life becomes a “game between
persons” in which people “live more and more outside nature, and less and less with
machinery and things; they live with, and encounter only, one another”. More effort is
focused on communicating and processing information. Thus, the rise of post-industrial
society leads to a growing emphasis on self-expression (Inglehart, 1997: 22).
Furthermore, the historically unprecedented wealth of advanced industrial societies,
coupled with the rise of the welfare state, mean that an increasing share of the
population grows up taking survival for granted. Their value priorities shift from an
overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing
emphasis on subjective wellbeing and quality-of-life (Inglehart, 1997: 23).
Inglehart and Baker (2000: 24) identify a mainstream cultural version of pre-industrial
societies. All of the pre-industrial societies for which they have data show relatively low
levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; most of them place strong
emphasis on religion; a tendency to emphasise male dominance in economic and
political life; deference to parental authority, and the importance of family life; and a
politics that is relatively authoritarian. Advanced industrial societies tend to have the
opposite characteristics. A survival/self-expression dichotomy is also expressed with
trust, tolerance, subjective wellbeing, political activism, and self-expression emerging
in post-industrial societies with high levels of security. At the opposite extreme, people
in societies shaped by insecurity and low levels of wellbeing, tend to emphasize
economic and physical security above all other goals, feel threatened by foreigners and
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gays and other out-groups, an insistence on traditional gender roles, and an
authoritarian political outlook (Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 26). The more uncertain
survival, either politically or economically, the more is cultural diversity threatening. In
their opinion, economic development impacts powerfully on cultural values.
Interestingly, rising levels of existential security are the key factor underlying
intergenerational value change. Intergenerational value differences are greatest in the
societies with the highest life expectancies. Across 61 societies, the correlation
between 1995 life expectancy and the size of the intergenerational difference in
traditional/secular-rational values is significant (Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 37).
But this evidence must not be essentialised as a one-way process because the broad
cultural heritage of a society, be it Protestant, Roman Catholic, Confucian, Hindu,
Rastafarian, Islamic or Communist, leaves an imprint on values that endures despite
modernisation, globalisation and economic development. Different societies follow
different trajectories even when they are subjected to the same forces of economic
development, in part because one or more of the multitude of situation-specific factors,
such as culture, geography, technology, weather, etc. also shape how a particular
society develops. The issue is one of probabilities, not determinisms. Economic
development tends to transform a given society in a predictable direction, but the
process and path are not inevitable. The United States is a particularly idiosyncratic
case, having a much more traditional value system than any other advanced industrial
society. On a secular/rational scale the United States ranks far below other rich
societies, with levels of religiosity and national pride comparable to those found in
developing, relatively poor, societies. This should alleviate some of the concern
expressed by those fearful of global “Americanisation” “even “McDonaldisation” of the
world, mentioned in the introduction. Industrialising societies in general are not
becoming more like the United States. In fact, as many observers of American life
have long argued, the United States seems to be a deviant case (Lipset, 1990; 1996).
Its people hold much more traditional values and beliefs than do those in any other
equally prosperous societies. If any nations in the world exemplify the cutting edge of
cultural change, it would most likely be one or more of the Nordic countries. Here
Richard Rorty argues (Rorty, 1996: 29) that the increasing strength of fundamentalism,
and the potential for fascism in the United States, (as compared with the Nordic
countries, for instance) is “because Americans are suffering the consequences of the
globalization of the labor market, without having established a welfare state.”
Relative Autonomy
Osborne (2001) is exemplary as one of those who takes a different tack against the
prevailing winds by showing, in the case of India, that “caste” as a cultural proposition,
has remained a useful ideological and political construct neither significantly affecting,
nor being significantly affected by economic development. As one might expect,
economic analysis, within the discipline of economics, of the caste system is scarce.
Akerlof (1976) and Scoville (1996) are two examples worth reading that have spent
time examining the economics of caste and its labour market underpinnings. But with
respect to the cultural role of caste and its positive or negative correlation to economic
development Osborne is breaking new ground.
Osborne (2001: 668) shows that the caste system facilitates the formation of pressure
groups on a government that has many rents to dispense and many factionalised
citizens eager to seek them. The logic of the power of pre-existing factions in India is
quite simple. Once an aggressively interventionist government exists, the choice facing
citizens is whether to obtain rents via caste or some other means. Given that caste-
membership requires little in the way of organising costs and is easy to verify, so that
it is difficult for members of one group to “pass” as members of another, the
continuance of these identities becomes a powerful cultural force in Indian society.
What is also evident is that the traditional social cleavages of caste and ethnicity are
far more important than economic interests, or class specificity and organization
(Kaviraj, 1997; Mencher, 1992; Thakur, 1995). An issue that has confounded
“modernisation” theorists, that is the incompatibility of caste structures with
urbanisation and development, is clearly explained by Osborne. The political economy
of caste, culture, and the material enhancement of economic development are
relatively autonomous. As long as the government remains open to rent-seeking as
liberalisation proceeds, it remains rational and efficient for citizens to adopt more
reliable forms of factional organization.
Another school of thought pushes the position of Osborne one step further, arguing that
a large number of traditional values and components of culture are impervious to
economic and political change (DiMaggio, 1994). The independence of culture from
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would give the Taliban a run for its money, as well as summer breaks from formal
education, incest taboos, patriarchy, etc. Osborne and DiMaggio leave Porter’s attempt
to demonstrate a ‘consuming’ international global culture somewhat at odds with the
evident differences in cultural traits at both the macro- and micro-level of human
interaction.
It may also be possible that the globalisation discourse itself may well be flawed and
based upon a mixture of poor social science, hyperbole, exaggeration and corporate
desire. Possibly, this is most likely why it works. That is, it works because it has a
highly receptive audience within the offices and boardrooms of the international
business community and is, in this sense, a self-affirming and self-propagating
proposition. It articulates a belief within management circles that something is
changing in the global economy and needs to be responded to by rethinking the way in
which business is organised. Thus it too becomes both an explanation and a
programme of action which all must follow in the competitive drama (Leyshon, 1997).
Conclusion
The main problem with the debate over the causal relationship between culture and
economic development is the pathetic inadequacy of human psychology, or analytical
laziness, when confronting complexity. The tendency to seek easy, single-factor
explanations of success or failure is to avoid the difficult mental labour of identifying
and analysing the intricate historical and structural interconnections amongst a
labyrinth of variables.
The peoples of northern Europe contributed nothing of fundamental importance to
Eurasian civilisation before the last 1,000 years. Since then, they may simply have had
the good luck to live at a geographic crossroad where they were likely to receive
advances (agriculture, wheels, writing, and metallurgy) developed in warmer parts of
Eurasia.
Those who view culture as the major factor in the production of material wealth often
choose to ignore historical trends, or have never been sufficiently educated given the
emphasis on disciplinary specialisation. For instance, the first major interaction
between Eurasian and the peoples of America involved the Inca emperor Atahuallpa
and the Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro in 1532. Pizarro, with only 62 soldiers
mounted on horses and 102 foot soldiers, slaughtered Atahuallpa’s forces of 80,000.
This was not due to the fact that the Incas were culturally inept, but because they
lacked horses and guns. Historically, those American tribes that were able to resist
European conquest, for any length of time, were those able to steal and master a
sufficient number of horses and guns. By 1700, guns had become the main tool in
conquest and slavery, and the conquest of Atahuallpa illustrates the set of proximate
factors that resulted in colonisation and wealth accumulation by Europeans. We should
be reminded that firearms had reached Japan in 1543 and the Japanese had very
sophisticated gun technology by 1600. However, given their vision of war as an art,
guns were despised as a barbarian’s tool and severely restricted for use by the
governmental authorities (Diamond, 1998: 74-76, 80, 257-258).
Horatio Kitchener, on behalf of the British Empire, closing the 19 th century and opening
the dawn of the 20 th century, (immortalised in a poster extolling the virtues of
country, army, god and the king) notably lived up to the reputation of a barbarian by
first slaughtering the dervishes of Sudan and then proceeding to kill, and “mop-up”, the
Boer rebels of South Africa who engaged his well-armed troops in their sadly
inadequate, somewhat medieval battle formation. And today, need one comment on
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technologically advanced nation whose collective morality is encased in military
computer systems. Diamond also reminds us that violent enslavement of indigenous
peoples, by European colonisers, was not the whole story by any means. In fact, the
prime reason for the decimation of non-European peoples was the nasty germs brought
to them by Europeans. Ninety-five percent of the 20 million North American Indians
were lost not only to the excessively violent, but to the disease-carrying ancestors of
Christopher Columbus and the “Pilgrims” (Diamond, 1998: 211).
This is not to negate the influence of particular elements of culture on the development
process but monolithic interpretations of culture like those of Landes or Huntington are
to be rejected. Culture presents many facets. There is no single culture that emerged
from earlier traditions or from the hegemonic power of the West. Broad generalisations
are counterproductive, bordering on racism; the Southeast Chinese are not
homogenous, and neither are the Malays, much less the Americans, Australians or
British. Though it affects economic development, culture itself is never a constant but
evolves jointly with economic opportunities. Huntington’s (1998) pessimistic view of a
global future of cultural clashes may do more to inflate military budgets than to
generate intellectual enrichment.
Economic Development, culture, modernisation and globalisation are better interpreted
as the complex processes resulting from the interaction of many different variables,
than as a distinctive causal processes in their own right. It is not intellectually helpful to
explain specific events and phenomena in terms of the macro processes or structures,
and pointless to subsume anything or everything under the umbrella of any single
causal agent or process (Jessop, 2000: 19).
A lesson to be remembered when confronted by the elicitations of cultural supremacy
is the lesson learned the hard way by the peoples of the Fertile Crescent, China, Islam
and the British Empire. Circumstances change, and past primacy has never been a
guarantee of future dominance. There are many possible solutions of how to make
sense of the world. They compete one with another, and we feel compelled to join this
or that stance or look for our own. While that choice is always ours, the complexity of
the things around and beyond us challenge the validity of those options.
References
Akerlof, George (1976). The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other
Woeful Tales. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 599-617.
Appadurai, Arjun (1996). Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Bakan, Abigail B. (1990). Ideology and Class Conflict in Jamaica: The Politics of
Rebellion. McGill: Queens University Press.
Bell, Daniel (1976). The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York: Basic Books.
Bell, Daniel (1973). The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books.
Bilig, Michael S. (2000). Institutions and culture: Neo-Weberian economic
anthropology. Journal of Economic Issues, 34(4), December: 771-788.
Blanchard, Oliver J., Froot, Kenneth A., Sachs, Jeffrey, and Blanchard, Jean O.
(1994). The Transition in Eastern Europe: Restructuring. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Brooke, James (2001). Accelerating Decline in Japan Evokes ‘Rust Belt’ Comparisons.
New York Times, 31 August <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/31/business
/31YEN.html> Accessed: 31-8-01.
Brinkley, Alan (1995). American History, A Survey. 9th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher (1989). Global Formations: Structures of the World-
Economy. Cambridge: B. Blackwell.
Chirot, Daniel (1994). How Societies Change. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge.
Chirot, Daniel (1977). Social Change in the Twentieth Century. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich.
Cox, Robert (1993). Structural Issues of Global Goverance: Implications for Europe,
in Gill, Stephen (ed.) Gramsci’s Historical Materialism and International
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 259-289.
Culture And Economic Development: <br>Modernisation To Globalisation http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol002.002/thompson.html
10 of 13 6/12/2011 11:28 AMDiamond, Jared (1998). Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the
last 13,000 Years. London: Vintage.
DiMaggio, Paul (1994). Culture and Economy, in Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R.
(eds.) The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press: 27-57.
Eagleton, Terry (2000). The Idea of Culture. Oxford: Blackwell.
Elliott, Dawn R. and Harvey, John T. (2000). Jamaica: An Institutionalist perspective.
Journal of Economic Issues, June: 393-401.
Frank, Andre Gundar (1998). Reorient : Global Economy in the Asian Age. Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
Frank, Andre Gundar (1966). The development of underdevelopment. Monthly
Review, 18: 17-31.
Friedman, Thomas (1999). The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding
Globalization. New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux: 8.
Fukuyama, Francis (1996). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.
Toronto: Free Press.
Fukuyama, Francis (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free
Press.
Harrison, Lawrence E. (1985). Underdevelopment is a State of Mind. Madison, WI:
Madison Books.
Harrison, Lawrence E. and Huntington, Samuel P. (eds.) (2000). Culture Matters:
How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books.
Holton, Robert J., and Turner, Bryan S. (1989). Max Weber on Economy and Society.
London: Routledge.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1998). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order. Carmichael, CA: Touchstone Books.
Inglehart, Ronald (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic,
and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald (1988). Cultural Change in Advanced Industrial Societies:
Postmaterialist Values and their Consequences. International Review of Sociology
3: 77-100.
Inglehart, Ronald and Baker, Wayne (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the
persistence of traditional values. American Sociological Review, 65(1), February:
19-21.
Jameson, Fredric and Miyoshi, Masao (eds.) (2000). The Culture of Globalization.
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Jessop, Bob (2000). Reflections on globalisation and its (il)logic(s), in Olds, Kris,
Dicken, Peter, Kelly, Philip F., Kong, Lily and Yeung, H.W. (eds.) Globalisation and
the Asia-Pacific. London: Routledge: 19-38.
Katz, Friedrich Katz (1998). The Life and Times of Pancho Villa. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Kaviraj, Sudipta (1997). Sociology of Political Parties, in Kaviraj, S. (ed.) Politics in
India. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Kipling, Rudyard (1899). The White Man’s Burden. McClure’s Magazine, 12,
<http://www.boondocksnet.com/kipling/kipling.html>, in Zwick, Jim (ed.)Anti-
Imperialism in the United States, 1898-1935 <http://www.boondocksnet.com
/ail98-35.html> Accessed: 7-9-01.
Krugman, Paul (1997). What ever happened to the Asian Miracle. Fortune, 18 August
<http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/#other> Accessed: 23-8-01.
Latham, Michael E. (2000). Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and
Nation Building in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press.
Lerner, Daniel (1958). The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle
East. New York: Free Press.
Culture And Economic Development: <br>Modernisation To Globalisation http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol002.002/thompson.html
11 of 13 6/12/2011 11:28 AMLeyshon, A. (1997). True stories? Global dreams, global nightmares, and writing
globalisation, in Lee, R. and Wills, J. (eds.) Geographies of Economies. London:
Arnold.
Ling, L.H.M. and Shih, Chih-yu (1998). Confucianism with a liberal face: The meaning
of democratic politics in postcolonial Taiwan. The Review of Politics, 60(1): 55-82.
Lipset, Seymour (1996). American Exceptionalism. New York: Norton.
Lipset, Seymour (1981). Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1990). American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed. Toqueville
Review, 10:23-45.
Mann, Michael (1986). The Sources of Social Power. Volume 1, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Marx, Karl 1867 (1987). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume I, New York:
International Publishers: 714-715.
McCloud, Donald G. (1995). Southeast Asia: Tradition and Modernity in the
Contemporary World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Mencher, Joan (1992). The Caste System Upside Down, in Gupta, D. (ed.) Social
Stratification. Delhi: Oxford University Press: 101.
Mittelman, James H. (1997). Globalization: Critical Reflections. London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
Modern History Sourcebook (2001). Albert Beveridge: The March of the Flag.
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1989beveridge.html> Accessed: 10-9-01.
Osborne, Evan (2001). Culture, development, and government: Reservations in
India. Development and Cultural Change, 49(3): 659-685.
Porter, Michael, Sachs, Jeffrey, Warner, Andrew and Schwab, Klein (eds.) (2000). The
Global Competitiveness Report 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pye, L.W. (1991). The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation. China
Quarterly 127: 443-66.
Pynchon, Thomas (1972). The Crying of Lot 49. New York: Bantam.
Rorty, Richard (1996). Emancipating Our Culture, in Niznik, Józef and Sanders, John
T. (eds.) Debating the State of Philosophy: Habermas, Rorty and Kolakowski.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Rostow, Walt Whitman (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist
manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ryser, Rudolph C. (1992). A Publication of the Center for World Indigenous Studies.
<http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/E/manifest/manif2.htm#sen> Accessed: 6-9-01.
Sachs, Jeffrey (1991). Spontaneous Privatization: A Comment. Soviet Economy, 7(4),
October-December.
Sachs, Jeffrey and Lipton, David (1990). Creating a Market Economy in Eastern
Europe: The Case of Poland. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 1, April.
Sahlins, Marshall (1974). Stone Age Economics. London: Tavistock Publications.
Schor, Juliet (1991). The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure.
New York: Basic Books.
Scoville, James (1996). Labor Market Underpinnings of a Caste Economy: Foiling the
Coase Theorem. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 55: 385-94.
Scully, Gerald (1988). Institutional Framework and Economic Development. Journal
of Political Economy 96(3): 622-662.
Swedberg, Richard (1998). Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Thakur, Ramesh (1995). The Government and Politics in India. New York: St.
Martin’s.
University of Groningen, Department of Humanities Computing (2001). From
Revolution to Reconstruction: A Hypertext on American History from the Colonial
Culture And Economic Development: <br>Modernisation To Globalisation http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol002.002/thompson.html
12 of 13 6/12/2011 11:28 AMPeriod until Modern Times. <http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/E/manifest
/manifxx.htm>.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1976). Modernization: Requiescat in Pace, in Coser, L. A. and
Larsen, 0. N. (eds.) The Uses of Controversy in Sociology. New York: Free Press:
131-35.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). The Modern World System. Vol. 1. New York:
Academic Press.
Weber, Max 1958 (1904). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated
by T. Parsons. Reprint, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Weiner, Myron, (ed.) (1966). Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth. New York:
Basic Books.
Wink, Andre (1990). Al-Hind, The Making of the Indo-Islamic World: Early Medieval
India and the Expansion on Islam, 7th-11th Centuries. Volume I, Leiden:  E.J.
Brill.
Theory & Science
Culture And Economic Development: <br>Modernisation To Globalisation http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol002.002/thompson.html
13 of 13 6/12/2011 11:28 AM